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Abstract
This study examines a critical incentive alignment issue facing FS-ISAC
(the information sharing alliance in the financial services industry). Failure
to encourage members to share their IT security-related information has
seriously undermined the founding rationale of FS-ISAC. Our analysis
shows that many information sharing alliances’ membership policies are
plagued with the incentive misalignment issue and may result in a “freeriding” or “no information sharing” equilibrium. To address this issue, we
propose a new information sharing membership policy that incorporates
an insurance option and show that the proposed policy can align
members’ incentives and lead to a socially optimal outcome. Moreover,
when a transfer payment mechanism is implemented, all member firms
will be better off joining the insurance network. These results are
demonstrated in a simulation in which IT security breach losses are
compared both with and without participating in the proposed information
sharing insurance plan.

Keywords: security, organization, information sharing, economic theory,
game theory, simulation
JEL Classification Codes: C70, D53, D71, D74, G22.

I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2009, Heartland Payment Systems, the sixth largest payment processor1 in the United States,
announced that hackers had compromised its processing systems. The effects of this information
technology (IT) security breach reverberated through dozens of partners that included Forcht Bank of
Kentucky, Farmers & Merchants Bank of Arkansas, and Adams Bank and Trust of New England. The
forensics team found that hackers were able to obtain account numbers using sniffer malware when the
systems were processing payments [Claburn, 2009]. The pattern and consequences of this breach were
very similar to another breach reported by the TJX Companies in 2007 that affected as many as 94
million credit card accounts.
Earlier, in 2008, the Bank of New York Mellon reported that sensitive data of over four million customers
who owned shares in public companies were compromised after the data were sent to a remote storage
facility. The data included names, addresses, and social security numbers. The estimated cost of this
breach was $197 per customer record. In another incident in 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
arrested an employee of Countrywide Financial Corporation for stealing and selling private information of
over two million mortgage loan applicants. The company estimated that the employee profited from
$50,000 to $70,000 from the sale of these private information [Mills, 2009].
The above incidents are just a few of the many IT security breaches that have been publicly disclosed in
the past few years. Today the financial services industry continues to face the prospect of an increase in
2
regulations, while at the same time having to combat persistent cyber threats. Costs associated with
information security breaches have also increased significantly. A study by the Ponemon Institute
indicated that the cost of data breach continues to increase [Ponemon, 2009]. The report stated that the
average total per-incident cost of a security breach in 2009 was $6.75 million. The report also stated that
the cost of lost business increased to 65 percent of data breach costs, up from 54 percent the year
before. A report from McAfee showed that information security losses amounted to over $1 trillion globally
in 2008 [Mills, 2009].
These incidents show that there is a need for increasing industry collaboration to reduce information
security risks. None of them represents a novel way of attack. Each has been well-documented, and best
practices for countering such threats have also been presented at length [Panko, 2003]. Yet none of the
victims had been able to obtain such information before the events occurred, and the disaster recovery
processes were largely unprepared.
At first glance, these cases appear to be independent. However, all these companies are members of the
Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC). The center was established by
the financial services sector under Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 in 1999. The directive, which
was later updated by the 2003s Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, mandates that public and
private sectors share information about the physical and security threats and vulnerabilities faced by
financial services organizations. As a nonprofit organization, FS-ISAC has over 7,000 members as of
June 2010. FS-ISAC is attractive to financial companies primarily because it is the only centralized official
portal capable of providing services specifically tailored to financial service companies. FS-ISAC offers
members benefits such as the publication of cyber threat level for the financial sector and early
notification of attacks based on a tiered membership structure: Core, Standard, Premier, Gold, and
Platinum. A color coded scheme is used for the type of information (white, green, yellow, and red). Each
tier varies in subscription cost, which in turn is linked to a plethora of services such as access to XML
data feeds, member contact directory, threat conference calls, free attendance at member meetings, and
trusted email registry.
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Heartland handles 100 million transactions per month for more than 250,000 businesses.
A brief list of other major financial services institutions which have suffered IT security breaches so far in 2011 includes Bank of
America, JP Morgan Chase, and Pentagon Federal Credit Union (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, “Chronology of Data Breaches
2005-present,”http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach, current March 4, 2011).

Even though FS-ISAC’s mission is to encourage cooperation between financial institutions to prevent or
limit instances of cyber attacks, its members continue to commit rudimentary mistakes. Heartland
Payment Systems would have been wary of similar mistakes other organizations (such as TJX) had made
in the past had such information been made available [Claburn, 2009]. However, without appropriate
incentives, member firms may find no particular motivation to share their IT security incident information
because such sharing often has a negative impact on the firm’s current and future profitability. This is
especially true for the financial services industry, which is one of the most competitive industries. The fact
that FS-ISAC requires its members only to voluntarily share security-related information also leads to the
prevalence of “free riding,” further impacting FS-ISAC’s efficacy.
In this research, we focus on the role of organizations such as FS-ISAC in successfully fostering
information sharing among its members. Although there have been several prior studies on the economic
incentives and consequences of information sharing, most of them have examined these issues from the
perspective of the firms. Organizations such as FS-ISAC have largely been viewed as free information
exchange portals that take a passive role in the network. We argue that the role of these organizations
has not been adequately addressed in prior research. For example, in reality FS-ISAC not only acts as an
information sharing forum, but also serves a pivotal role in directing the behaviors of its member firms
through its membership policies and provision of value-added services.
To better understand the dynamics in information sharing alliances such as FS-ISAC, we develop a game
theory model to study the existing information sharing network membership policies and their impact on
the level of information sharing and the resulting economic welfare of its member firms. We find that the
membership policies of most information sharing alliances may actually either lead to a “free-riding” or a
“no-information-sharing” equilibrium and yield outcomes inconsistent with their mission statements. We
identify the sources of such problems and demonstrate that the incentives of member firms can be
aligned to avoid the “free-riding” problems in such information sharing alliances. In particular, we propose
to integrate an innovative insurance plan with a revised membership policy and create a new mechanism
that not only generates incentives for members to actively engage in information sharing activities but
also provides insurance coverage to members that suffer a loss from security attacks. We show that the
inclusion of the insurance policy can yield an outcome consistent with the social optimal equilibrium.
Moreover, by implementing a mechanism that redistributes the gains from information sharing, all firms
will be better off joining the proposed insurance network.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature pertaining to security
information sharing. Section III presents a baseline model that analyzes the existing information sharing
networks’ membership policies. Section IV extends the baseline model to include an insurance plan and
examines whether such a policy will motivate firms to actively share information. Section V discusses the
implications of our findings and offers directions for future research. Section VI concludes the article.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Over the past few years researchers have begun to extend seminal works in information systems (IS)
security such as Baskerville [1993], Dhillon and Backhouse [2001], and Siponen [2005]. Many of these
studies investigate the causes and consequences of security breaches at the firm level and have focused
on areas such as governance [Straub and Nance, 1990], information privacy [Greenaway and Chan,
2005], development of best practice security models [Ma and Pearson, 2005], maintaining data integrity
[Ba, Stallaert, Whinston, and Zhang, 2005], preventing unauthorized user access [Zviran and Haga,
1999], developing secure applications [Tryfonas, 2007], and encouraging information security in the
workplace [Whitworth and Zaic, 2003]. At the same time, researchers have begun to realize that failures
in IT security mechanisms are caused not only by bad design, but also by inferior incentive mechanisms
[Anderson and Moore, 2006]. This has also resulted in a growth of research that utilizes game theory and
microeconomics to study firms incentives and strategies in their battles against security breaches
[Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou, 2003; Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan, 2004; Gal-Or and
Ghose, 2005; Gordon and Loeb, 2002]. This stream of research generally concludes that without proper
incentive mechanisms, organizations tend to rely on technological solutions to protect their information
systems.

As a result of this finding, application of incentives in an organization’s security strategy has been
categorized as being critical to preventing and countering security attacks [Acquisti, 2004; Gordon et al.,
2003]. Varian [2000] states that, in a typical organization, security analysts should not only investigate
weak points in a system, but they should also go one step further and examine the incentives of those
responsible for the system. Economics theory would suggest that insurance is an approach toward the
development of an effective security metric. In a typical insurance model, underwriters use expert
assessors to consider a client’s infrastructure and attribute an associated element of risk, following which
a premium is decided. This area of economics of IS security is both underdeveloped and underutilized.
According to Bohme [2005], the reason for this is the interdependence of risk, since a firm’s IT
infrastructure is connected to other entities, a firm’s efforts to improve its IT infrastructure may be
undermined by failures elsewhere. This interdependence also reduces members’ incentives to invest in
security technology and increases their reliance on cyber insurance [Baer and Parkinson, 2007], making
cyber insurance an unattractive option for insurers. Therefore, a catalyst may be necessary to stimulate
the interests of the insurers. Due to the unique role of information sharing alliances such as FS-ISAC, if
properly designed, the insurance they offer can potentially be the catalyst that may finally fulfill the goals
of reducing the losses from security breaches for the financial services sector. However, there is a need
to consider market distortions that will result from the asymmetry of information [Cawley and Philipson,
1999] between well-informed members and poorly informed supplier of insurance, which may lead to the
adverse selection problem. Bandyopadhyay, Mookerjee, and Rao [2009] state that cyber insurance has
not fulfilled its initial hype due to the presence of information asymmetry between customers and
providers, leading to overpricing of cyber insurance contracts.
Another area that may be subject to the incentive misalignment issue is the information sharing activities
related to security breaches. Information sharing has been studied extensively in the economics literature
in the context of non-security related trade associations [Gal-Or, 1985; Shapiro, 1986; Vives, 1990]. The
information shared involves either an industry’s demand parameter or the individual firm’s cost parameter,
and most of these studies focus on investigating the optimal information sharing strategies to maximize a
firm’s profits. Recently, due to the increasing frequency and soaring costs of security breaches, this
stream of research has been extended to the IS security arena [Cavusoglu and Raghunathan, 2004; GalOr and Ghose, 2005; Gordon and Loeb, 2002]. Although most studies show that there are significant
benefits associated with information sharing activities, pitfalls associated with sharing security information
among organizations have been recognized. Researchers have found that failures in IS security systems
are caused not only by the lack of channels for sharing information, but also by the lack of incentive
mechanisms. Unlike information sharing in the traditional trade association context, a firm may attempt to
avoid the responsibility of sharing with the hope that they can take advantage of the information provided
by other firms in the network. Anderson [2001] discusses various distorted incentives that could arise in
the security information sharing process due to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Gordon,
Loeb, and Lucyshyn [2003] show that information sharing might lead to situations where some firms
would have an incentive to free-ride on the information security expenditures of the other firms. This
finding is similar to the conclusion reached in Varian [2004], which states that free-riders will emerge
when the reliability of a system depends on the total efforts contributed by all stakeholders.
Building on these findings, we seek to extend the research on incentive mechanisms in IT security
information sharing alliances. A review of the literature shows that most studies assume that
organizations such as FS-ISAC are passive intermediaries that offer only free information sharing
services, and the information shared by these agencies alone can significantly reduce security risks
facing firms. These assumptions fail to capture three important characteristics of information sharing
activities within networks such as FS-ISAC: (1) To maintain its operations and leverage service quality,
organizations such as FS-ISAC offer their services at a fee (most prior studies assume that these
organizations do not charge a fee to its members): such a fee can have a significant impact on a
member’s information sharing behavior in the network; (2) Without existing security information
technology infrastructure, information shared by these organizations alone cannot significantly reduce the
risk of security breaches; investment in security technologies serves as an important strategic
complement to information sharing activities; (3) The goal of organizations such as FS-ISAC is not to
maximize its member firms’ profits, but to increase the overall system reliability and reduce the total
losses from security breaches.

To better capture the impact of these characteristics on the dynamics of the information sharing activities,
we use game theory to model the behaviors of various players in an information sharing network. Game
theory is the study of a multi-agent strategic decision-making process and is widely used in economics,
computer science, political science, and many other disciplines. A central feature of game theory is the
strategic interdependence of multi-agent (multi-player) interaction. Each player in the game recognizes
that the payoff she receives (in utility or profits) depends not only on her own actions but also on the
actions of other individuals [Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995]. Hence, with the assumption of
rationality, each player chooses the best strategy in response to the actions other players have taken or
will be taking to maximize her payoffs. The term game highlights the importance of strategic interaction
and forward looking in capturing the behaviors of players under study. Due to the rational and structured
nature of the theory, mathematical models are often chosen to represent the calculation of payoffs by
various players. A more thorough review of game theory can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole [1991],
Myerson [1995], and Osborne and Rubinstein [1994], along with the classic references of Von Neumann
and Morgenstern [1944] and Schelling [1960].
In the following section, we develop a baseline game theory model with two firms to examine how the
existing information-sharing alliances membership policies affect a firm’s information sharing efforts and
identify reasons that lead to the “free-riding” behavior. We then generalize the baseline two-firm model to
an N-firm setting and incorporate an insurance option and compare the equilbria derived in both
situations.

III. A BASELINE GAME THEORY MODEL
Model Setup
As it is general in game theory modeling, we start the analysis by setting up a simplified model that has
only two firms in an information sharing network. Such a simplified model allows straightforward derivation
of the results without introducing too many parameters and can be easy to follow for readers who are not
familiar with the game theory approach. We then show that, without loss in generality, the results derived
from the two-firm setup can be extended to an N-firm setting.
Consider a market that consists of FS-ISAC and two financial services firms, indexed by i = 1, 2. Let Ai
denote a firm’s total assets (Ai>0). Both firms face similar security risks in their information systems (there
exist some hackers who will attempt to compromise systems of both firms). To reduce such risks, both
firms devote a fraction of their total assets αAi (0<α<1) to enhance the security of their systems.3 Firms
can split their security budget between: (1) investment in security technologies, ti (i.e. network security
components such as a firewall or antivirus software), and (2) a membership fee fi to participate in an
information sharing network (such as FS-ISAC) in exchange for security-related information which can be
used to reduce the firm’s system vulnerability. In order to enjoy member benefits, member firms are also
required to voluntarily share information related to the security of their information systems such as
attacks detected, security breaches, self-discovered system vulnerabilities and associated solutions, if
any. For simplicity, we normalize the total amount of security-related information shared by firm i to a
fraction si (0≤si≤1), where si = 0 indicates that firm i does not share any information and si = 1 means firm i
shares all the security-related information it possesses. After FS-ISAC receives the information
contributed by the membership firms, it analyzes the information and classifies it into security warnings,
virus patterns, software patches, technical solutions, disaster recovery tips, etc. and provides processed
information to its member firms. We use a general function ri(fi, ∑si) to represent the amount of
information FS-ISAC delivers to firm i. It is worth noting that ri is not always equal to the total amount of
information member firms report to FS-ISAC, ∑si, which is essentially si + sj in our two-firm setup. As will
3

In our model, α is assumed to be a constant value rather than a decision variable. The reason is that, for the majority of the
organizations, the fraction of budget allocated to information security is typically determined prior to the start of the fiscal year.
Hence, it is not very likely that firms will freely increase the security budget once the fiscal year begins. In this study, we are trying
to capture the reality that firms have to make a strategic decision in the presence of budget constraint. Therefore, a constant
upper-bound of the security budget will allow us to better model the tradeoffs firms have to make. Moreover, allowing the fraction
to be different will only change the optimal level of security information sharing investment, but that will not change the results
derived from the model and our conclusions. Hence, for simplicity and analytical tractability, we assume this fraction to be a
constant.

be shown later, ri also depends on FS-ISAC’s membership policy and the membership level chosen by
the firm (often represented by the membership fee fi that firm i pays), and ∑si, the total amount of
information available to FS-ISAC.
Firms make their decisions in a three-stage sequential game in which the outcome occurred in an earlier
stage of the game becomes public information to all players involved in subsequent stages of the game.
In stage 0, FS-ISAC announces the membership policy (to be discussed in more details later). In stage 1,
both firms simultaneously decide on their respective levels of information sharing si. In stage 2, FS-ISAC
sets a membership fee fi based on its membership policy and the amount of the information it collects
(∑si), and then both firms simultaneously decide on their respective levels of security information
technology investment (ti) as well as their membership levels (at cost fi), subject to the budget constraint:
ti+fi≤αAi. The sequential nature of the game implies that firms can determine the best way to allocate its
resources after FS-ISAC announces its membership fee structure.4
Let P(ti, Ai, ri(fi, ∑si)) be the probability of a successful defense by firm i against a security attack. Such a
probability depends on three factors: (1) ti, the level of security technology investments, (2) Ai, a firm’s
total assets, and (3) ri(fi, ∑si), the total amount of information FS-ISAC delivers to firm i. Here we use a
collective measure ∑si to represent the value of the information even though firm i already possesses part
of the collective information si. This is because in reality the information obtained from a particular security
attack can be fragmented and carries very little useful information until it is extrapolated with other related
information. Hence the collective measure can better represent the value of the information. We assume
that the probability function is concave5 and twice differentiable in both ti and ri, ∂P/∂ti>0, ∂P/∂Ai<0, and
∂P/∂ri>0. That is, all else being equal, the more a firm invests in security protection technologies, the less
likely its systems will be compromised. Conversely, all else being equal, the greater a firm’s total assets
(and presumably the larger the firm’s information systems), the more resources it takes and the more
difficult it is to protect the firm’s systems from security breaches. Finally, all else being equal, the more
information obtained from FS-ISAC, the more likely it is that a firm can be better prepared and reduce the
vulnerability of its information systems.
In reality, security technologies alone, to some extent, can reduce the likelihood of security breaches
even if a firm does not have too much information about the security attacks and its system vulnerability.
On the contrary, the security information FS-ISAC delivers to its members alone cannot prevent a firm’s
information system from being compromised if there is no technology infrastructure in place to implement
any preventive actions. 6 Therefore, we assume that security information sharing is a strategic
complement to security technology investment in improving the system’s reliability, but not vice versa.
More specifically, when ti = 0, regardless of the value of ri, P(ti, Ai, ri) = 0, whereas when ri = 0, as long as
ti>0, P(ti, Ai, ri)>0. Accordingly, we reconstruct the probability function to capture this complementary
relationship.7
P(ti, Ai, ri(fi, ∑si),) =

,∑

.

(1)

4

The reason that we consider firms to set their information sharing in stage 1 and determine their level of security technology
investment in stage 2 is because the amount of money firms are willing to spend on a membership fee to enjoy the benefits of
security information sharing depends on the total amount of security information available to them. Also, member firms cannot
determine the amount of money they will spend on security information sharing before FS-ISAC publishes the fee structure, which
in turn depends on the amount of information member firms submitted.

5

A twice differentiable concave function ensures that a solution exists for the optimization of the function. It also implies that there
is decreasing return to scale for variables involved in the function.

6
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An example is that FS-ISAC shares some patterns (or source code) of certain viruses. However, if the firm does not have a
firewall or antivirus software, it cannot take any actions to block these malicious codes in order to prevent its systems from being
breached by these viruses.
Equation (1) can be viewed as a simple form of the Cobb-Douglas production function widely used in the economics literature to
measure the output of various complementary production factors [Simon and Blume, 1994]. In our context, the complementary
factors are technology investments ti, and the information provided by FS-ISAC, ri, as an increase in one factor implies a
decrease in the other factor.

A firm suffers a loss if hackers breach its information system. Let
denote the direct losses incurred as
a result of a security breach, such direct losses include but are not limited to lost business (i.e., bank
customers cannot perform the routine deposit/withdraw activities due to malfunctioning information
systems), data loss (i.e., the costs of retrieving lost information or replacing compromised credit cards),
hardware/software costs (i.e., the costs of recovering the breached systems), etc. We measure the direct
losses as a fraction ( ) of a firm’s total assets, since, all else being equal, the direct losses of security
breaches are largely a function of the cost of replacing/repairing services impacted [Whitman and
Mattord, 2006], which, in turn, depends mainly on the size of the firm. Since such losses may be
dependent on some unknown exogenous factors and, hence, vary from case to case, we also allow to
be uniformly distributed on an interval [0, Φ], where α<Φ<1.8
At the same time, based on FS-ISAC’s rules, member firms should voluntarily submit their security-related
information to FS-ISAC and allow other members to share such information. However, since consumers
in the financial market are extremely sensitive about system security, disclosing IT security breaches
information may lead to significant indirect losses to a firm. Such losses are often intangible (e.g.,
decreased customer loyalty) and depend on the extent of sharing by the firm itself as well as by the other
firm. In general, the losses increase with the amount of security information shared by the firm itself, but
decrease with the amount of security information shared by the other firms.9
Based on the above assumptions, a firm’s objective is to protect its information systems from suffering a
security attack and to try to minimize any costs associated with such an attack (regardless of whether it is
successful or not). Therefore, firm i’s objective function10 is:
,∑

–

,

s.t. ti+fi≤αAi.

(2)

where
can be regarded as the value of a secure system to firm i, sj denotes the amount of information
shared by the other firm j, di1 measures the extent of indirect loss to firm i as a result of sharing its IT
security-related information, and di2 measures the extent of indirect positive impact that the other firm’s
information sharing has on firm i. As discussed above, we assume that di1>di2 so that the negative impact
of information sharing cannot be completely offset by the same behavior by the rival firm.
Currently the membership policy varies across different information sharing alliances. We broadly classify
these policies into three different categories: (i) a free membership for small firms with a limited amount of
information, (ii) a hierarchical membership fee structure in which the membership fee is proportional to the
member firm’s total assets, and (iii) a hierarchical fee structure based on the amount of information
requested by the member firm. Note that in case (i), fi=0 and ri(fi, ∑si)=r·(∑si), where the ratio r is a
/ ̅ , where ̅ is the highest asset level among all FS-ISAC
constant set by FS-ISAC. In case (ii)
members and F is the membership fee FS-ISAC charges its members. Unlike the role of a private agent
assumed in other studies, the objective of FS-ISAC is not to maximize its own profits. Rather, it seeks to
reduce the total losses to its members due to security breaches. Hence when FS-ISAC sets the fee F, it
will make sure that such a fee is affordable to all members, that is, F<αA⇔ <αAi . In case (iii), fi=(ri/R)F,
where R=∑si, the maximum amount of information FS-ISAC can deliver to its members. In this case, firms
can determine the amount of information they request from FS-ISAC and pay a proportional membership
fee.
In the next section, we solve the model in the game theory framework and analyze how the current FSISAC membership fee policies affect member firms’ information sharing behaviors.
8

This assumption ensures that the maximum direct cost of a security breach is larger than a firm’s security budget but does not
exceed a firm’s total assets, which we believe, based on the current history of cyber attacks, is a true reflection of the reality.

9

For example, if Firm i shares a lot of information about a security breach in its information systems, it will have a negative impact
on Firm i’s competitiveness in the market. However, such a negative impact can be partially reduced if the rival firm also reveals
information about a similar security breach.

10

Our results still hold if we construct a firm’s objective function as a minimization problem where the firm is minimizing its expected
loss and overall costs. However, for ease of interpretation, we present it as a maximization problem.

Key Results from the Baseline Model
Following the standard approach in the game theory literature, we solve the model using backward
deduction.11 We start by examining the firm’s strategy regarding security technology investment in stage
2, then we substitute the optimal level of technology investment obtained from stage 2 into the firm’s
maximization problem in stage 1 and derive the firm’s optimal information sharing strategy.
In stage 2, the firm chooses the optimal level of technology investment to maximize its objective function.
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to ti yields the following first order condition (FOC):12
,∑

1

,∑

,∑

.

(3)

Since different FS-ISAC membership policies lead to different ways to compute the membership fee fi
and, consequently, the information sharing benefits FS-ISAC delivers to its members, ri(fi, ∑si), we
analyze the firm’s strategies case by case below.
In case (i), since the membership fee is free and the amount of information FS-ISAC delivers is a constant
ratio of the total information available, we can rewrite equation (3) as:
∑

′

1

∑

1.

Since the above equation was derived by differentiating the objective function with respect to ti, the lefthand side of this equation can be interpreted as the marginal benefit of technology investment, and the
right-hand side of the equation can be interpreted as the marginal cost of technology investment.
Therefore, as long as the marginal benefit of technology investment is greater than the marginal cost (i.e.,
′

∑

1

∑

1), a firm will devote its entire security budget to technology investment

). In reality, most firms have a limited IT security budget relative
until the budget constraint is met ( ∗
to its potential loss and often exhaust their budget before the marginal return of technology diminishes;
).
hence, we focus on the case where the budget constraint is binding13 ( ∗
Next, going back to stage 1, the firm’s objective is to maximize equation (2) given the optimal technology
into (2) and differentiating (2) with respect to
investment ∗ derived from stage 2. Substituting ∗
stage 1 decision variable si yields the following FOC:
′

1

∑

.

(4)

The above FOC is similar to one of the situations studied in Varian [2004] in which he analyzes users
behaviors when the reliability of the system depends on the total efforts exerted by all users. Following
the approach used in Varian [2004], let G(.) be the inverse of the derivative of the probability function P(.),
we can simplify (4) to derive the reaction function for firm i:
/

/

.

(5)

Since 0≤si≤1, the equilibrium outcome depends on the value of the first component on the right hand side
/
/
of equation (5). When
2, it leads to si+sj>2 which violates the constraint that 0≤si≤1.
11

Sequential games cannot be solved using forward-deduction due to the temporal nature of the game, namely, players in an
earlier stage cannot predict the strategies of other players that would occur later.

12

In mathematics, the solution to an optimization problem is generally obtained by differentiating the objective function with
respect to the variable of interest and solving the resulted equation, also known as the first order condition (FOC).

13

Binding constraint means that the solution to the optimization problem is beyond the range of values that meet the requirement
of the constraint and, hence, will result in a “corner solution” which equals a boundary value set by the constraint. We derive the
same result when the budget constraint is not binding. Since the nonbinding solution involves a more complicated expression,
for simplicity we present our results derived from the case where the constraint is binding.

Hence the FOC outlined in (4) cannot be met, resulting in a corner solution in which si*=sj*=0, indicating
that at equilibrium no firms are willing to contribute any information.14
/

/

2, an interior solution can be derived from equation (5). In our model the
When
.
probability function P( ) is the same for both firms, and α, r, and E[f] are all constants. Therefore, the first
component on the right-hand side of equation (5) differs only in di1 and Ai. In this situation, which firm will
provide more information will depend on the benefit-cost ratio Ai/di1. To illustrate how the equilibrium
emerges in this case, we plot the both firms’ reaction functions in Figure 1 and derive the Nash
equilibrium graphically.

Sj
Nash Equilibrium

1/

/

1
1/

/

1

Si

Figure 1. Nash Equilibrium in Baseline Model Case (i) (Assuming Aj/dj1> Ai/di1)
In Figure 1, the dashed line and the solid line represent the reaction curves for si and sj, respectively, and
the Nash equilibrium is where the two reaction curves intersect. Figure 1 shows that, in case (i) where FSISAC offers a free membership and a fixed ratio of the total available information to its members, the
Nash equilibrium involves firm j (with a higher benefit-cost ratio Aj/dj1) providing all the information and
firm i free-riding on the information provided by firm j. This result is very intuitive: when the amount of
information FS-ISAC delivers to its members depends on some exogenous factors unrelated to
information sharing, only the firm that benefits most from information sharing (i.e., either the firm with
greater assets, hence, can save more from information sharing or the firm with smaller negative impact of
information sharing) has incentives to contribute information and enhance the benefits of information
sharing.
Next we examine if the equilibrium derived in case (i) will still emerge if FS-ISAC charges a membership
fee to its members. In case (ii), FS-ISAC charges a membership fee that is proportional to a member
/ ̅ , where F is the membership fee FS-ISAC charges to the member with the
firm’s total assets (
̅
highest level of assets ). Accordingly, the amount of information FS-ISAC delivers to firm i is also
proportional to the firm’s total assets: ri(fi, ∑si)= / ̅ (∑si). Since the membership fee each firm pays is a
fixed ratio of its security budget, similar to case (i), as long as the marginal benefit of security technology
investment is greater than the marginal cost, firms will devote the remaining budget to enhancing their
security technologies. In other words, ∗ will be a fixed fraction of the firm’s total assets Ai( ∗
/ ̅ ). Substituting ∗ into (2) and differentiating with respect to si yields:

14

This could happen when r, the extent of information sharing set by FS-ISAC, is too small or when firms have very limited
security budgets (small ).

′
̅

1

∑
̅

̅

̅

Similar to case (i), since , ̅ , and E[ ] are all constants, the intercept of the reaction function is
/ ̅ , we can rewrite firm i’s reaction function15 as:
determined by di1 and Ai. Let
/

.

/ ̅

(6)

In this case, free-riding may still occur as long as the first component on the right hand side of equation
(6) differs between the two member firms.16 However, which firm will be willing to contribute information is
unclear, due to the opposite effects a firm’s total assets have on the benefits of information sharing. On
the one hand, as in case (i), the firm with greater assets values the benefits of information sharing more,
as their loss will be larger should a security breach indeed occur. On the other hand, due to FS-ISAC’s
membership policy, firms with greater assets are also entitled to more information from FS-ISAC,
effectively reducing their incentives to share more information. Given these two counteracting effects,
under some circumstances, it is likely that the firm with a higher benefit-cost ratio Ai/di1 may choose not to
share any information and free-ride the information provided by the firm with a smaller benefit-cost ratio,
resulting in a further distorted equilibrium.
The analysis so far has led to the following results:
Result 1: Free-riding or no information sharing may arise as a Nash equilibrium if FS-ISAC’s
membership fee is free or based on the total asset level.
Result 2: In case (i) where the membership fee is free (for small firms) and free-riding is the Nash
equilibrium, the firm that has a higher benefit/cost-ratio has more incentive to share information.
Result 3: In case (ii) where the membership fee depends on a firm’s total assets and free-riding
is the Nash equilibrium, under some circumstances even the firm that has a higher benefit/cost
ratio may choose to free-ride the information provided by the firm with a lower benefit/cost ratio.
Next, we examine case (iii). When FS-ISAC sets a membership fee based on the amount of information a
member firm requests, the benchmark membership fee F is the highest fee FS-ISAC charges to members
who demand all the security-related information. For firms that choose not to request the full amount of
information, the membership fee will be proportional to the amount of information it requests. That is,
∑ .
fi=(ri/∑si)F=αAi–ti. Accordingly, the amount of information FS-ISAC delivers to firm i is:
Therefore, firm i’s maximization problem can be rewritten as:
∑

–

.

(7)

Unlike the previous two cases, firms need to strategically determine how they will split the budget
between technology investment and FS-ISAC membership fee.17 As before, we start by examining firm’s
strategy in stage 2. Differentiating equation (7) with respect to ti yields the following FOC:
′

∑

1

∑

0.

(8)
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A reaction function is a function that represents a player’s best response to other player(s)’ action(s). Jointly solving a group of
reaction functions is a common method to derive the equilibrium of a game (the best outcome for all players involved in the
game).

16

As discussed in case (i), if the first component on the right hand side of equation (6) is too large, then the FOC cannot be met
and a corner solution will arise in which no firms are willing to share any information.
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As in the previous two cases, we assume that the budget constraint is binding.

Since P'(ti)>0 when 0<ti≤αAi , solving equation (8) yields:
∗

,

(9)

.

(10)

∑
∗
∑

Not surprisingly, a higher membership fee F increases a firm’s investment in security technology since the
marginal benefit of information sharing decreases relative to that of technology investment. Conversely,
the more information FS-ISAC collects (∑si), the more likely a firm will prefer to allocate more of its budget
to paying a information sharing membership fee.
Going backward to Stage 1, substituting (9) and (10) into (7) yields:
∑
∑

∑

–

.

Since the functional form of the probability function P(.) is unknown, we are unable to derive an explicit
expression for si*. However, to gain some insights from this case, we discuss a simplified form of the
model. Let F(∑si) be the function FS-ISAC uses to determine the benchmark (highest) membership fee. It
is reasonable to expect that the fee FS-ISAC charges depends on the total amount of information it
collects (∑si) and is increasing in ∑si. We assume that ∂F/∂∑si=m, where m is a scalar exogenously
determined by FS-ISAC. This assumption implies that the benchmark membership fee F is a linear
function of the total amount of information available to FS-ISAC. In this case, we can simplify expressions
(9) and (10) to:
∗

,

(11)

∗

.

(12)

(11) and (12) suggest that ti* and fi* do not depend on ∑ . Substituting them into equation (7) yields:
–

.

Since the only component in the objective function that involves si is di1si, it is straight forward that both
firms will not share any security-related information because doing so will only results in some detrimental
effect on the firm itself without reducing its system vulnerability. Hence, a firm’s optimal strategy is not to
share any security-related information and to invest only on security technologies.
Result 4: In case (iii), when the benchmark membership fee FS-ISAC charges is a linear function
of the total amount of information available to FS-ISAC, both firms will choose not to share any
security-related information.
The above results can be easily extended to a setting where there are n member firms in the network.
Therefore, we conclude that the current membership policies adopted by various information-sharing
alliances all have the potential to suffer the free-riding problem. Under some circumstances, the
membership fee policy may even lead to an equilibrium where none of the firms is willing to share any
information. These outcomes are largely because the existing membership policies fail to align the
interests of the individual members with the benefits of the entire network. More specially, the
membership fee charged to a given member is not associated with the amount of information it shares,
which to some extent explains the puzzle we described in the introduction―although many victims of the
security attacks are members of FS-ISAC, information about security breaches are not shared effectively
within the network due to the lack of an appropriate mechanism to encourage sharing. To address this
issue, in the next section we propose a new membership policy that incorporates an insurance option and

examine whether such a new policy can encourage member firms to share more information and reduce
the potential loss from a security attack. Moreover, since several prior studies indicate that insurance
companies may be reluctant to offer cyber insurance due to the possibility that they may not profit from
the security market, we also investigate if such an insurance plan is feasible from the insurer’s standpoint.

IV. AN EXTENDED MODEL
Our analysis in Section III shows that even if FS-ISAC customizes its membership fee based on the
individual member’s asset level or demand for information, the member firm may not have a strong
incentive to truthfully share any security-related information with other firms in the network. Hence, the
solution to this problem lies in establishing a mechanism that ties a firm’s membership fee to the amount
of information it contributes and demonstrating that firms will be better off paying such a membership fee
to participate in an information sharing alliance, rather than fighting independently against various security
vulnerabilities. However, as stated in the introduction, a major challenge of such a mechanism is the
difficulty involved in measuring and monitoring how much security-related information a member firm
possesses relative to how much information it discloses, which is probably one of the main reasons why
the current FS-ISAC membership fee policies does not involve the amount of information shared by a
member firm. Without a robust approach to measure this critical output factor, it is impossible to create an
incentive compatible mechanism to resolve the free-riding issue that currently prevails in many
information sharing networks.

Social Optimal Outcome
In order to derive such a mechanism, we start by exploring what the optimal outcome is from the social
welfare’s standpoint. Assuming that there is a social planner who coordinates the behaviors of various
member firms in an information sharing network such as FS-ISAC, this social planner aims at maximizing
the overall security protection (or minimizing the total losses due to security breaches) of all members
within the network. In other words, when there are n firms in the network, the social planner seeks to
maximize the following objective function:18
,∑

∑

∑

∑

∑

.

(13)

Since the goal of the social planner is not to maximize the profits of FS-ISAC and there is a positive
relationship between the overall benefits and the information available to each member firm, namely
ri(∑si), it follows that providing a free membership19 to member firms will maximize the above objective
function. That is, set fi=0 so that ri(∑si)=∑si and ti≤αAi. Substituting fi=0 into the above objective function
and differentiating with respect to ti yields the following FOC:
′

1

∑

1

∑

1.

Let function G(·) be the inverse of the derivative of the probability function P(·). We can rewrite the above
FOC as:
∗
∑

∑

= ∑

.

(14)

where k(∑si) is a function of ∑si. Since member firms can enjoy the benefits of information sharing without
paying a membership fee, as long as the marginal benefit of technology investment is greater than 1
(marginal cost), each firm will devote as much budget to maximize the technological protection until
equation (14) is satisfied or when the budget limit is reached, whichever comes first. Moreover,
because ,
, and ∑si are identical across firms, equation (14) also implies that the social optimal level
of technology investment is a fraction of the firm’s assets and this fraction is the same across firms.
18

In the N-firm setting, the indirect positive effect for firm i is computed as di2 multiply Max(sj), the maximum amount of information
shared by other firms.
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For simplicity, we are assuming that the cost of running FS-ISAC is zero. Our results will still hold if there is a positive cost.

Going back to stage 1, each member firm will determine how much security-related information it will
contribute given its expected technology investment derived in (14). Substituting (14) (or ti*=αAi if the
budget constraint is binding) into the objective function (13) and differentiating with respect to si yields:20
∑

′ ∑

∑

∑
Since

′

1

∑

′

1

∑

(if the budget constraint is not binding), or
(if the budget constraint is binding).

(15)

is the same across firms, we can rewrite (15) as:
1

∑

1

∑

∑

(if the budget constraint is not binding), or

∑
∑

(if the budget constraint is binding).

(16)

Both expressions in (16) show that a key difference between the social planner’s optimal strategy and
that of the individual member firm is that the social planner takes into account all the assets that could be
affected by the information sharing behavior (∑Ai), whereas the individual member cares only about its
own assets (Ai). Hence, as long as the negative impact factor di1 is similar across member firms, all
members will contribute equal amount of information and the extent of sharing increases with the total
wealth within the network (∑Ai).
Based on this result, we proceed to explore whether an incentive mechanism can be built into the
membership policy to achieve this social optimal outcome. In a prior study on system reliability, Varian
[2004] proposes that, to avoid free-riding in a system that depends on collective efforts, a fine equal to the
cost of a system failure to all other users should be imposed on the user who is most likely to deviate from
exerting efforts. Can we introduce a similar mechanism into information sharing networks such as FSISAC to eliminate the free-riding issue and achieve a higher level of information sharing?
Unfortunately, a thorough evaluation of the characteristics of the information sharing alliances shows that
such a mechanism is infeasible due to a number of reasons. First, as discussed earlier, in the financial
industry, the cost of a single security breach can reach as high as several million dollars, not to mention
the costs of all security breaches for the entire network. Imposing such a huge fine on a single institution
is practically impossible and would only discourage firms from joining the network. Second, as recognized
in Varian [2004], if such a fine is used to compensate the victims of a security attack, it will change the
behaviors of these victims. When the liability payment is too large, it may actually encourage members to
“seek to be injured” (in our context, this is equivalent to inviting security attacks). Last, but not the least,
such a mechanism might induce firms to reduce their investments in security technologies and rely solely
on liability payments to cover the losses from security breaches, leading to a potential moral hazard issue
that could jeopardize the existence of organizations such as FS-ISAC.

An Insurance Model
To address the aforementioned issues, based on the idea of “liability payment” introduced in Varian
[2004], we propose that information sharing alliances such as FS-ISAC should revise their existing
membership policies and incorporate an insurance plan that is affordable to members of information
sharing alliances and yet compatible with the objectives of information sharing. The insurance plan aims
at achieving three goals: (1) to encourage firms to join an information sharing alliance and truthfully
disclose their security-related information, (2) to improve the overall system reliability of all members
within the network, and (3) to provide compensations to firms who actively participate in the information
sharing activities through insurance premium from all members. Specifically, the changes we propose
are:

20

Since P'(·) is a decreasing function, G(·) is also a decreasing function. Hence both expressions in (15) yield the same outcome.

1) FS-ISAC offers an insurance plan to its member firms. Such an insurance plan provides coverage
up to a certain limit (discussed in more detail later) when a member firm suffers some losses from
an IT security breach.
2) The insurance premium replaces the existing membership fee. As long as a member firm is
enrolled in the insurance plan offered by FS-ISAC, the firm is entitled to full access to the
information shared by all other members and does not need to pay an additional membership fee.
3) The insurance covers only loss suffered from a security breach but not from other security
incidents (i.e., employees selling sensitive customer information to outsiders, loss of data during
transportation process, natural disasters, etc.).21
4) Unlike the insurance plans offered in other markets where the insurance premium depends on the
coverage level, in our extended model the insurance premium depends on the expected losses of
all member firms. More specially, in an information sharing network where there are n member
firms, the insurance premium Firm i pays is calculated as the average expected loss across all
firms in the network:
∑

∑ 1

/ .

5) For firms enrolled in the insurance plan, if they suffer a loss from a security breach, FS-ISAC will
compensate them based on the amount of funds available (total amount of premium collected)
and the actual loss of the firm (denoted by ALi) relative to the total losses occurred within the
entire network. That is, the loss coverage provided to firm i, denoted by LCi, is represented as:
1

1

∑

∑

The purpose of this rule is to protect the FS-ISAC from going bankrupt in the event that the total losses is
much larger than the insurance premium FS-ISAC has collected.
To analyze this new policy, we rewrite Firm i’s objective function as follows:
1

∑

–

∑ 1

1

∑

1

1

∑

∑

.

Note that even though the actual loss occurred to a firm is unknown (neither is the actual loss coverage),
a firm can maximize its objective function based on the expected values of the factors involved in the
calculation of the loss coverage. Since
1

∑

∑

∑ 1

∑

, it follows that

, and Firm i’s objective function becomes:
–

∑

∑

.

(17)

As before, we solve the model using backward deduction. In Stage 2, the firm’s FOC with regard to ti is:
∑
∑

.

(18)

Note that in this insurance model the marginal cost of technology investment is n times larger than the
marginal cost in the baseline model. Therefore, the budget constraint is much less likely to be binding and
an interior solution is more likely to arise. Let G(·) be the inverse of the derivative of the probability
function P(·). We can rewrite (18) as:
∗
∑
21

∑

= k(∑si)Ai.

(19)

This rule avoids member firms to rely on the insurance to cover losses that cannot be minimized through information sharing.

Furthermore, since n,
and ∑si are all the same across firms, equation (19) shows that the optimal
level of technology investment is a fraction of the firm’s assets and this fraction is the same across firms.
Substituting (19) into (17) and differentiating with respect to si yieds:
∑

∑

∑

.

Since G is the inverse of P'( ), the two functions cancel out and we can rewrite the above FOC as:
1

∑

∑

,

∑

(20)

which is the same as the optimal solution to the social planner’s problem derived in (16). Hence, the
insurance plan we propose enables FS-ISAC to achieve the social optimal level of information sharing.
Result 5: When firms pay an insurance premium equal to the average expected loss of all the
firms within the insurance network, it will lead to the social optimal level of information sharing
behavior.
From (20) we can also derive the firm i’s reaction function:
∑

∑

∑

1.

(21)

Since the function form of P(·) is unknown, we are not able to derive a closed form solution for the Nash
equilibrium. However, if k(∑si) is twice differentiable in si, and the first term on the right hand side of (21)
differs across firms, the parallel reaction curves that we see in Figure 1 do not arise in equilibrium. Firms’
reaction curves will intersect at a point not locating on either X- or Y-axis, leading to a Nash equilibrium
that does not involve the free-riding behavior.
Result 6: Free-riding does not arise in equilibrium when firms pay an insurance premium equal to
the average expected loss of all the firms within the insurance network.
Incentives to Join the Insurance Network
When the insurance option is available, an important issue is whether member firms are willing to pay the
premium and enroll in the insurance plan. We compare the equilibrium solutions both in the presence and
absence of the insurance option to examine whether firms will be better off joining the insurance network.
From the above analysis, we know that, if a firm chooses not to participate in the insurance plan, it invests
in security technology only to maximize its objective function. This optimal solution is given by: ∗
. Substituting ∗ into a firm’s objective function yields the firm’s maximal benefits in the absence
of insurance coverage:
.
For ease of comparison, we also substitute the same

∗

into a firm’s objective function22 that

includes the insurance coverage:
– 1
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Since this ti is not the optimal level of security technology investment derived from the objective function with the insurance
coverage, the resulted equilibrium payoff will be less than that of the insurance equilibrium. Hence, if, at this technology
investment level, enrolling in the insurance plan leads to a better outcome than not doing so, then it follows that, at equilibrium,
the insurance equilibrium will dominate the noninsurance equilibrium.

It follows that in order for a firm to enroll in the insurance plan, the premium it pays plus the net indirect
effect of information sharing (di1si – di2Max(sj)) must be less than its expected loss in the absence of
insurance. That is, the following condition needs to be satisfied:
1

1

∑

∑

1

.

(22)

Since the function form of the probability function P(·) and the parameters values of di1 and di2 are all
unknown, we are not able to derive an explicit result. However, assuming that the net indirect impact of
information sharing is small relative to expected loss of a security breach, then the option a firm prefers
reduces to the comparison of the insurance premium and the expected loss of a security breach, that is:
1

1

∑

∑

and 1

. A quick comparison of these two expressions

shows that when a firm is enrolled in the insurance plan, the probability of successfully protecting its
systems from being compromised is much higher than that in the absence of the insurance. Furthermore,
as the number of firms that join the insurance plan increases, this probability further increases (due to
higher ∑si). Hence, for a firm whose asset level is larger than or equal to the average asset level within
the network, it will be better off enrolling in the insurance plan. However, the outcome of the comparison
is undetermined if a firm’s total asset level is much smaller than the average. Inequality (22) suggests that
by paying an insurance premium equal to the average expected loss of all firms in the network, a small
firm will have to bear some extra risks ceded from other larger firms in the network. Hence if a firm’s asset
level is significantly lower than the average asset level in the network, it may not benefit as much from
enrolling in the insurance plan as those whose total assets are relatively high. The above discussion
leads to the following conclusion:
Result 7: When firms are similar in the asset level and the net impact of information sharing is
small relative to the expected loss of a security breach, firms will be better off joining an
information sharing network and enrolling in the insurance plan.
To address this issue, we propose to add an additional rule to the insurance policy.
6) Firms enrolled in the insurance plan will be categorized into different groups based on their asset
levels (i.e., large, medium, and small). FS-ISAC will charge firms in the large group an additional
premium to compensate firms in the small group. This transfer payment is calculated as one half
of the difference between the expected loss of a large and a small firm in the absence of
insurance.
1

1
2

The transfer payment seeks to eliminate the incentive misalignment that results from the unproportional
premium imposed on small firms. We illustrate how the transfer payment works in Figure 2.

Firm’s Expected Loss
A large firm’s expected loss in
the absence of insurance.

1

A transfer payment equal to 1
A medium firm’s expected loss
in the absence of insurance.

1

1

2

1

1

1

∑

A firm’s expected loss in the presence
of insurance (same for all firms).
A small firm’s expected loss in
the absence of insurance.

Figure 2. A Transfer Payment Scheme
Figure 2 shows the expected loss of firms of different sizes both in the presence and absence of
insurance and how the transfer payment is calculated. It is obvious that larger firms benefit most from
enrolling in the insurance plan, followed by medium firms. Depending on the actual size and the amount
of information provided by the insurance network, small firms may or may not benefit from enrolling in the
insurance network. However, if FS-ISAC charges large firms an extra fee equal to one half of the
difference between the expected loss of a large and a small firm in the absence of insurance and
transfers this payment to small firms, it effectively makes the expected loss of all firms within the network
equal to the expected loss of an average sized firm. Since an averaged sized firm will be better off joining
the insurance network, it follows that:
Result 8: All firms will be better off joining the insurance plan if FS-ISAC charges large firms an
extra fee equal to one half of the difference between the expected loss of a large and a small firm
in the absence of insurance and transfers this payment to small firms.
This transfer payment effectively aligns the premium with the benefits derived from enrolling in the
insurance plan. More importantly, the transfer payment is based on some exogenous factors and does
not involve a firm’s decision variables such as ti and si; hence, incorporating this new rule does not
change the equilibrium results derived in our extended model, and the total premium collected is still
equal to the total expected loss from all firms.

V. SIMULATION
In order to demonstrate how the insurance plan proposed in our article helps to enhance the protection
against cyber attacks and reduce the overall losses for companies participated in an information sharing
network, we conducted a simulation to compare the total security losses of a sample of 100 firms with and
without participation in an information sharing insurance plan. The two parameters that need to be
randomized in this simulation are the firms that suffer a security breach in a given time period and their
degree of losses from this security breach, .
Our baseline case was the loss suffered from a series of security attacks without firms participating in the
insurance plan. In this baseline case, as shown in Results 1 through 4, member firms have no incentive to
share any security-related information. Hence, the optimal protection strategy is to invest all of their
security budgets to security protection technologies ti. Accordingly, the direct loss to a member firm can
be computed as the product of the probability of its systems being compromised p( ), its total assets Ai,

and the degree of loss from an attack . We started the simulation by randomly generating 100 firms with
a mean asset level of $100 million and a standard deviation of $10 million. 23 This represented an
information sharing network consisting of member firms of approximately the same size. These firm sizes
were fixed throughout the simulation. Next, to reflect the longitudinal nature of the security breach
problem, within each simulation, we repeated the randomization for the probability of security breaches
and the degree of loss variables 120 times to simulate 120 months of continuous security attacks for
these 100 firms. Based on equation (2), given that a firm’s security budget is a function of its total assets,
the probability of a member firm’s information systems being compromised is the same across all member
firms. We assumed such a probability is 10 percent, implying that within a given month, an average of ten
out of 100 firms would suffer a loss from security breaches, and these ten victim firms were randomly
generated for each month. For each firm randomly chosen as a security breach victim, we also randomly
generated a value for the degree of loss that varied in the range between 0 and 10 percent of the firm’s
24
total assets. Based on these randomized numbers, we computed the monthly security loss of each
individual firm during the 120-month period to obtain the monthly total losses of all firms during this
period. As a result, we had a series of 120 total losses data points for each simulation. The upper solid
line in Figure 3 shows the monthly total losses of these 100 firms in the 120-month span for a given
simulation. Since no security-related information was shared among member firms, it is not surprising to
see the total losses occurred are normally and independently distributed, with an approximate average
loss of $5.5 million, and a lack of a clear trend. The dotted line is the monthly total losses of these 100
firms averaged across 20 simulations. It follows a smoother trend but shows the same pattern as
demonstrated in the individual simulation.
Next, to examine what would happen if our proposed insurance plan was implemented on these 100 firms
and the same security attacks were to occur again in the same 120-month period, we computed the
monthly total losses of these 100 member firms that now shared their security breach information and
participated in the insurance plan. As discussed in Section IV, when the insurance option is available,
member firms will have strong incentives to share information related to prior security attacks in return for
similar information from other member firms. Accordingly, their losses will be covered by the premium
collected by the information sharing network. In the presence of insurance participation and information
sharing, one important distinction is that the probability of security breaches is no longer a constant value
as modeled in the baseline case but will change from month to month. To compute the probability of
security breaches, we operationalized the contribution of the shared security information to the probability
of security breaches based on the amount of losses suffered by a given firm. In other words, we assumed
that each security attack was independent and the more losses suffered by a firm, the more information it
would be able to contribute to the information sharing network; thus reducing the probability of security
risks facing the entire network. Moreover, consistent with the set-up in our analytical model, and to
capture the fact that new attacks constantly emerge which cannot be fully prevented through the use of
past security breach information, we discounted the contribution of security breach information through a
25
concave function and modeled it as a variable that showed decreasing return to scale.
Similarly, since the insurance premium was based on the expected losses of all firms, which change as
the amount of the shared security-related information increases, we also computed the premium as a
dynamic variable based on the overall losses in the previous period. For the first period, we used the
average losses in the absence of insurance in the baseline case to determine the premium. Because
these firms were assumed to be of similar sizes, for ease of computation, the insurance premium paid by
a given firm was the total expected losses divided by 100, which was the number of firms in our
simulation.
23

Note that changing the values of these randomization parameters does not change the results, as long as the randomized
variables follow the same distribution.
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Changing the value of this probability does not change our results, as this probability is the same across all member firms.
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Because we did not assume a specific function form in the analytical analysis, for this simulation we used a backward induction
approach to determine a specific functional form. Namely, we assume that there is a breakeven point in a concave probability
function where the probability of security breaches is 10 percent when the firm’s security budget is equal to 90 percent of its
expected loss (which can be computed from the average loss simulated in the baseline case in which the probability of security
breaches is exactly 10 percent). Through this approach, we are able to recover a concave probability function.

Based on these new parameters and the same random numbers for the degree of losses generated in
the baseline case, we computed the total losses of these 100 firms and plotted the results from one
simulation as the bold solid line in Figure 3. We then repeated the same simulation 100 times and plotted
the averages total losses from the first twenty simulations and from all 100 simulations in the dotted and
double lines in Figure 3. These lines show a clear downward trend over time, thus supporting the
prediction of our proposed insurance model. For a given simulation, there are occasional spikes which
capture unexpected increases in security losses caused by either a random disastrous security incident
(i.e., security breaches of highly sensitive or valuable information) or a surge of new attacks not observed
before (as represented by a random larger number of victim firms than projected). Despite these spikes,
the overall security losses are clearly decreasing due to the contribution of shared security breach
information. Moreover, it is interesting to note that within the first few months, the security losses from
insurance participants can be higher than those who do not enroll in the insurance plan. This is largely
due to the security budget constraint imposed in our model, which requires member firms to reduce their
investment in security protection technology in order to pay for the insurance premium, and hence
increasing the probability of security breaches in the earlier periods. However, the overall security
vulnerability will begin to decrease as firms share more information, effectively reducing both the
insurance premium and the probability of security breaches. Therefore, these higher security losses will
become less and less likely in the subsequent periods.

Figure 3. Comparison of Simulated Security Breach Loss (Firms of Similar Sizes)
Finally, the average plots evidently exhibit a consistent pattern as observed in the individual simulation
plot, with a notable difference that occasional fluctuations in security loss essentially disappear,
demonstrating the consistency of our proposed insurance method when implemented in a broader scope.
In the above simulation analysis, we show that firms of similar sizes generally benefit from participating in
an information sharing insurance plan. Nevertheless, what happens if member firms vary substantially in
asset level? Does the insurance option still dominate the noninsurance option? To answer this question,
we performed the same simulation on a different sample of firms. This time we generated another 100
random numbers for firm size from a distribution that had the same mean value ($100 million), but with a
higher standard deviation of $100 million. We computed the total losses for these 100 companies using
the same method and random numbers used in the aforementioned simulation. We plotted the results in
Figure 4. These plots show that the conclusions we drew in the previous simulation analysis also apply to
this sample, with the only difference being that there is a higher degree of variation in overall security
losses for firms that did not participate in the insurance plan, which was anticipated due to a larger

variation in firm asset level, and the probability of incurring a security breach on a much larger firm than
those generated in the previous simulation. Hence, we can safely conclude that the results derived from
the analytical model are supported by our simulation analysis, and regardless of asset levels, firms will
enjoy significant savings by enrolling in an information sharing insurance plan.

VI. DISCUSSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The analysis in Section IV shows that in our proposed membership policy, the insurance premium can
serve as an instrument to align the incentives of member firms in sharing their security-related
information. When the insurance option is absent, as shown in our baseline model, member firms have no
incentive to share their security-related information due to a situation similar to the classic “prisoner
dilemma.” Even though each member firm will be better off sharing more information, the simultaneous
nature of the game and the difficulty involved in verifying and penalizing the non-cooperative behavior will
lead
some
firms
to
free-ride
the
information
shared
by
other
firms
and

Figure 4. Comparison of Simulated Security Breach Loss (Firms of Different Sizes)
minimize the amount of information they disclose. As a result, the reliability of member firms’ information
systems remains unchanged after a firm joins an information sharing alliance such as FS-ISAC.
When an insurance option is incorporated into the membership policy, any potential loss from a security
breach is covered by the insurance and the only significant cost factor is the insurance premium.
Naturally, a member firm has a strong incentive to reduce the amount of premium it pays. Since the
premium is based on the average expected loss of all member firms within the network, the only way for a
firm to reduce its premium is to supply the maximum amount of information it possesses to increase the
other members’ system reliability. Of course, increasing the level of information sharing may also increase
the indirect negative impact on the member firm itself. Nevertheless, such a negative effect will be largely
offset by a similar information sharing action by the other member firms and the savings from the
insurance premium will more than likely compensate the net effect. By comparing the firms’ expected loss
with and without the insurance option, our analysis suggests that when firms are similar in their total
assets and the net negative impact of information sharing is small relative to the expected loss of a
security breach, they will all be better off joining the insurance network.

However, our analysis also shows that if firms differ significantly in terms of asset levels, smaller firms
may choose not to purchase insurance due to the relatively high premium it has to pay compared to its
low expected loss in the event of a security breach. Consequently, the information sharing network can
attract only firms with similar asset levels. This finding can be explained intuitively: The purpose of the
insurance policy is to share liabilities among member firms and hold every member accountable for the
other member’s system reliability. Under the initial insurance policy, the identical premium implies that
members will share equally the expected loss from security breaches within the entire network. Since
), small firms face a disadvantage as they have
such a loss is proportional to the other firm’s assets (
to undertake a larger burden of security losses than they do without enrolling in the insurance plan.
Despite the coverage FS-ISAC provides and the improved system reliability, it may not compensate the
extra cost of the small firms. In this case, even though enforcing the proposed insurance plan may result
in the socially optimal outcome, it may come at the cost of small firms and, hence, is not incentive
compatible.
To cope with this potential limitation, we revise our proposed insurance policy and implement a transfer
payment from large firms to small firms. The transfer payment subsidizes small firms by reallocating the
gains from fostering information sharing among various member firms, and results in the same social
optimal outcome as achieved in the original insurance plan. Hence, it provides the most incentive
compatible mechanism to the current information sharing alliances.
In addition to motivating firms to join the network and share information, the proposed insurance policy
also ensures that any organization that provides the insurance plan will be solvent in the presence of
increasing security attacks. The way insurance premium and coverage is calculated suggests that the
insured has sufficient fund to cover all the claims from member firms. In the long run, we expect that such
an information sharing network will attract more and more firms to participate, leading to a healthy
sustainable growth cycle. Both prospects will provide important incentives for insurance companies to
step into the market of cyber insurance.
Although the above analysis sheds some interesting light on existing information sharing alliances’
membership policies, it is worth noting that our proposed model may be subject to a number of limitations
due to its simplistic nature of the analytical model. The values of some parameters, such as the value of
information and the probability of security breaches, may be difficult to determine in practice. Our
simulation analysis offers a first attempt to assess security losses in the presence of an information
sharing insurance plan. Other possible extensions of our study include the addition of the individual firm’s
security rating in the computation of insurance premium and different coverage levels for firms facing
different risks. In short, we believe that our model presents an alternative approach to solve the incentive
alignment issue currently confronting most information sharing networks and extensions to our proposed
insurance policy will be interesting and valuable topics for both practitioners and researchers.

VII. CONCLUSION
This study examines a critical incentive alignment issue that exists in the information sharing alliance in
the financial services sector and possibly other information sharing networks. Failure to encourage
members to share their security-related information has seriously undermined the founding rationale of
organizations such as FS-ISAC. Our analysis shows that the existing information sharing membership
policies are plagued with the danger of encouraging members to free-ride the information shared by other
members, leading to an outcome opposite to those proposed in these organizations’ mission statements.
In light of these findings, we propose to revise the existing information sharing network membership
policy and incorporate an insurance option. The proposed new policy seeks to address the incentive
problem from the social planner’s perspective. We contend that organizations such as FS-ISAC are not
merely a platform that facilitates information sharing among its member firms. They actually can play an
important role in shaping the member firms’ behaviors. Our results show that our proposed insurance
policy can indeed align members’ incentives to share their security-related information and lead to a
social optimal outcome. We also demonstrate that when FS-ISAC categorize member firms based on the
levels of their total assets and implement a transfer payment equal to one-half of the difference between
the expected loss of a large and a small firm in the absence of insurance, all firms will be better off joining

the insurance network, and such a joint effort will lead to significant enhancement in the overall security
across the network and significant savings in security breach losses.
The results of our study have important theoretical and practical implications in the security arena. The
insurance model developed in this study differs substantially from any insurance policy currently offered in
any markets. It is designed to address the problems presented in the field of information security. To the
best of our knowledge, no such insurance model has been proposed. Hence, we believe that our novel
theoretical model will challenge and shift current paradigms in research and practice. Other than the
financial services industry, many other industries have also been confronted with increasing risks from
cyber attacks. The method proposed in this study can be applied to those industries, too. In the short run,
it may take some time for the network to accumulate a critical mass and reach the scale to leverage the
power of information. Temporary loss may occur as a result of initial inefficient pricing of insurance
premium, and inaccurate forecast of security risks and government subsidy may be needed for the cyber
insurance market to take off. However, we expect that these issues will resolve as the network grows and
policy makers have a better understanding of the dynamics in such a network.
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